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Abstract—The integration of Internet-of-Things and pervasive
computing in medical devices have made the modern healthcare
system ”smart.” Today, the function of the healthcare system is
not limited to treat the patients only. With the help of implantable
medical devices and wearables, Smart Healthcare System (SHS)
can continuously monitor different vital signs of a patient and
automatically detect and prevent critical medical conditions.
However, these increasing functionalities of SHS raise several
security concerns and attackers can exploit the SHS in numerous
ways: they can impede normal function of the SHS, inject false
data to change vital signs, and tamper a medical device to
change the outcome of a medical emergency. In this paper, we
propose HealthGuard, a novel machine learning-based security
framework to detect malicious activities in a SHS. HealthGuard
observes the vital signs of different connected devices of a SHS
and correlates the vitals to understand the changes in body
functions of the patient to distinguish benign and malicious
activities. HealthGuard utilizes four different machine learning-
based detection techniques (Artificial Neural Network, Decision
Tree, Random Forest, k-Nearest Neighbor) to detect malicious
activities in a SHS. We trained HealthGuard with data collected
for eight different smart medical devices for twelve benign
events including seven normal user activities and five disease-
affected events. Furthermore, we evaluated the performance
of HealthGuard against three different malicious threats. Our
extensive evaluation shows that HealthGuard is an effective
security framework for SHS with an accuracy of 91% and an
F1 score of 90%.
Index Terms—Healthcare, Smart Healthcare System, Anomaly
Detection, Smart Medical Devices, Implantable Medical Devices,
Security
I. INTRODUCTION
A rapidly growing aging population and a massive rise in the
cost of healthcare have escalated the dire need of an efficient
healthcare system. Indeed, according to recent figures, the
global healthcare market is expected to reach $ 53.65 billion by
2025 [1]. In this fast-growing landscape, recent advancements
in medical technology have led the way to better diagnostic
tools, better treatment for patients, and devices that improve
the quality of life. Specifically, with the introduction of high
precision medical sensors and Internet-of-Things devices and
applications, healthcare systems have become both smart and
ubiquitous. Nowadays, the use of Smart Healthcare Systems
(SHSs) is not limited to the medical facilities only. Besides the
clinical usage, SHS also includes implantable and wearable
medical devices to gather, store, and process various types
of physiological data during daily activities of a patient [2].
Moreover, SHS can connect with the nearby devices or cloud
(e.g., smartwatch, fitness tracker, glucose monitoring devices,
etc.) and offer a proactive approach to early detection and even
prevention of medical conditions [3]. SHS also enhances the
clinical and administrative workflow of healthcare organiza-
tions, and help in the massive demand for more efficient and
error-free healthcare industry.
While SHS enables many benefits with improved technol-
ogy, they unfortunately also face myriads of cybersecurity
threats. Moreover, cybersecurity maturity in healthcare is still
in its early stage and healthcare data tends to be richer
than financial services or retail data. A popular example of
security concern was disabling the wireless connectivity of the
pacemaker of individuals to protect it from hacking [4]. In the
academic community, researchers demonstrated several cyber
attacks against a commercial Implantable Cardiac Defibrillator
(ICD) and Implantable Medical Devices (IMD), where an
attacker could disable or reprogram the therapies performed by
an ICD/IMD [5]. However, balancing security, privacy, and us-
ability is a challenge in the healthcare domain. Any issue con-
cerning trustworthiness should be addressed aggressively and
proactively because of the catastrophic health consequences.
Thus, this area requires the immediate attention of information
security research communities, medical device manufacturer
and regulatory bodies. Although there are some device-specific
solutions provided by the researchers, no comprehensive and
centralized solution has been proposed to protect SHS from
malicious threats [6].
To address these emerging threats and shortcomings of
the SHS, in this paper, we present a novel security frame-
work, HealthGuard, to detect malicious activities in a smart
healthcare system (SHS). Our framework is built upon the
observation that for any change in the physiological functions
of a patient, the vital signs of a specific set of medical
devices changes. HealthGuard observes each device in a SHS
separately and correlates the vital signs from different devices
to understand the overall status of the patient. HealthGuard
also uses the correlation of different body functions to differ-
entiate normal user activities and disease-affected activities.
In HealthGuard, the framework utilizes different Machine
Learning (ML)-based detection algorithm (Artificial Neural
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Network, Decision Tree, Random Forest, k-Nearest Neighbor)
to detect malicious activities in the SHS. We collected data for
eight different smart medical devices and twelve benign activ-
ities (7 normal user activities and 5 disease-affected scenarios)
to train HealthGuard. We also evaluated HealthGuard against
three different threats. Our evaluation shows that HealthGuard
can detect malicious activities in SHS with an accuracy of
91% and F1-score of 90%.
Contributions: To summarize, our contributions are three-fold:
• We present HealthGuard, a ML-based, data-driven security
framework to detect threats in SHS. HealthGuard can cap-
ture the correlation between different body functions of the
patient and observe the vital signs of different smart medical
devices to detect malicious activities in a SHS.
• We trained HealthGuard with data collected from nine
databases for eight different devices and twelve benign
activities including seven normal user activities and five
disease-affected cases.
• We evaluated HealthGuard against three different threats.
Our extensive evaluation illustrates that HealthGuard can
detect different threats to smart healthcare system with high
accuracy and F1-score.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We
provide an overview of security vulnerabilities in healthcare
systems and existing solutions in Section II. The detailed
overview of the smart healthcare system is provided in Section
III. In Section IV, we discuss the problem scope of the current
solution while focusing on this work and our considered threat
models. In Section V, the detailed overview of HealthGuard
is provided. We illustrate the efficiency of HealthGuard in
detecting several malicious activities by analyzing several
performance metrics in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss different threats to SHSs and ex-
plain the shortcomings of existing security solutions available
on different platforms.
A. Security Vulnerabilities
SHS provides real-time monitoring and treatment to check
the patient’s health status but the functional complexity is
also increasing day by day, and it makes the reliability more
challenging than ever. Different works have outlined several
security threats and these security threats to SHS can be
categorized into four topics: hardware, software, side-channel
and radio attacks. Hardware Trojan attacks have emerged as a
major security concern for integrated circuits (ICs) as most ICs
are manufactured in outsourced fabrication facilities. Besides
for Hardware Trojan attack, there is EM radiation which can
be exploited to recover internal information from the medical
devices. EMI injection is pushed into an implantable cardiac
defibrillator’s sensing leads to stop it from delivering the
pacing signal [7]. Additionally, it has been shown that elec-
tromagnetic interference might be the reason for temporary or
permanent malfunction in pacemakers and ICDs [8]. In 2016
a ransomware attack on the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical
Center shut down its network for ten days, preventing staff
from accessing medical records or using medical equipment
until the hospital paid the ransom about $17,000 [9]. Security
researcher of MedSec studied St. Jude Medical Maerlines
Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) and reported
a ”crash attack” which described a loss of radio connectivity
with the CIED because of sending undisclosed radio traffic
causing the CIED to stop working [10].
B. Existing solutions
A high-precision, low-overhead embedded test structure
(ETS) called REBEL was proposed to detect delay anomalies
in Hardware Trojans (HTs) [11]. To prevent unauthorized
access, limiting the communication range is an intuitive way
to prevent radio attacks. In that scenario, near-field communi-
cation (NFC) and RFID-based channel can be utilized since
they are designed for short-range communication. A better
approach is a near-field communication (NFID) that is an
extension of RFID which is gaining popularity due to its
integration on mobile phones [12]. Alkeem et al. proposed
a security framework depending on sensors located on the
wearable devices [13]. Sangpetch et al. proposed a security
context framework to design the system and to evaluate secu-
rity in existing systems of interest [14]. Abie et al. proposed
a risk-based adaptive security framework using game theory
and context-awareness techniques [15].
C. Difference existing solutions
Our framework implements an entirely new approach to
detect malicious activities in SHS. There is no direct compa-
rable solution to our work. The differences between existing
solutions and HealthGuard can be noted as follows: (1) While
existing solution focuses on the sensors located on the wear-
able devices [13], HealthGuard detects malicious behaviors
by considering interconnected body function. (2) HealthGuard
builds a machine learning-based data-driven security frame-
work where user identification unit for the medical devices
is not required [14]. (3) HealthGuard does not include any
overhead cost of processing complexity on the sensor node
to collect data from different devices [15]. (4) Unlike threat-
specific existing solutions [11], [13], HealthGuard can detect
three different types of threat in a SHS which makes it a more
robust solution.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly describe a SHS and different
design assumptions and features that we have considered in
solution.
A. Connected Smart Healthcare System
SHS refers to a medical device or a group of medical
devices which are equipped with different physical sensors
to collect data from a patient’s body and surroundings and
take autonomous decisions to provide improved treatments.
Also the inclusion of information and data sharing between
patients and health service providers using wired or wireless
technology (Bluetooth, ZigBee, etc.) improve access to care,
quality of care, and increase the overall efficiency of the
healthcare system. As mentioned earlier, the smart healthcare
system may consist of a single or multiple smart medical
devices (e.g., wearables, wireless devices, implantable devices,
etc.). Here, for this work, we consider multi-device SHS.
In addition to these devices, SHS also considers different
non-medical parameters (e.g., the location of the patient,
physical status, etc.). to provide a correct diagnosis of an event
(disease, body condition, etc.). Here, different vital signs of the
patient are collected by the devices to understand the overall
condition of the patient. These vital signs are represented as
analog signals along with their nominal values in Figure 1
where vital signs are obtained, sampled and digitized for
transmission as network packets to a Central Data Processing
Unit (CDPU) [16]. The CDPU observes the overall condition
of the patients based on the vital signs forwarded by the
smart medical devices and alerts the physician in case of
an emergency situation. In some instances, CDPU also takes
autonomous decisions such as suggest new medicine, change
the dose of the medicine, etc. For example, in Figure 1, the
EEG and ECG signal monitor observe the neural activities
of the patient and the heart condition, respectively. If any
body function or state of the patient change, it will change
ECG and EEG signal patterns. A healthcare professional can
observe the change in the ECG and EEG signal and interpret
this change as a cardiovascular problem. Additionally, SHS
can be programmed to determine different pre-defined states
(e.g., atrial problem, myocardial infraction, etc.) and provide
autonomous treatment to the patient.
B. Interconnected Body Function
The functions of different organs in a human body are
interconnected, and if any organ behaves abnormally, it affects
the overall condition of the human body [17]. For example,
if the heart rate suddenly increases in the body, it may end
up causing heart palpitations, shortness of breath, etc. causing
abrupt functions in other body organs. As SHS can observe
different body functions at once, this interconnection can be
detected and used as a feature to identify the cause of the
problem. We consider this interconnection of body function
as a feature of detecting anomalous behavior in SHS. For
example, if we find a patient has high blood pressure, then
the patient has cardiovascular risk factors where major risk
factors are hypertension, cigarette smoking, physical inactivity,
etc. Targeted organ damage are the heart, brain, chronic
kidney disease, etc. Identifiable causes of hypertension are
sleep apnea, drug-related problem, chronic kidney disease,
etc. [18]. So in this scenario, high blood pressure of a patient
can be confirmed by observing the vital signs collected from
ECG, blood pressure, glucose monitoring, oxygen monitoring,
sweating, EEG, and sleep monitoring device.
C. Analysis of Anomalous Behavior
Anomalous behavior analysis refers to a model which
defines all the normal behavior in a system to differentiate
Fig. 1: An example of a smart healthcare system.
abnormal behavior. The capability of detecting unknown at-
tacks makes the anomaly behavior analysis suitable for smart
healthcare security framework. However, the major challenge
to implementing such an analysis method in a SHS is to
establish the ground truth from normal behavior with a low
false positive rate. To overcome this problem, we propose an
anomaly behavior analysis of the devices based on patients
health condition and activities. For instance, if a person is
working out in the gym, his heart-rate will rise, the oxygen
level will decrease, breathing will increase, and certain brain
waves will change in a pattern. To detect anomalous behavior
in a SHS, a security framework should understand the ongoing
activity in the human body and determine whether the activity
is benign or malicious based on the vital signs collected
from connected smart health devices. We consider different
day-to-day user activities as well as vital signs of the body
for specific diseases to understand the benign activities and
identify malicious states in a SHS. For example, a person takes
high cholesterol food who does not have high blood pressure
suddenly gets an alarm in a blood pressure monitoring device
because it crosses the minimum threshold for systolic≥ 120.
We consider both regular and disease affected scenario of the
devices by observing user activities and usage patterns to build
the ground truth of HealthGuard.
IV. PROBLEM SCOPE
In this section, we describe the problem scope of Health-
Guard using a use case scenario. Moreover, we explain dif-
ferent threats considered in HealthGuard that can lead to
malicious activities in SHSs.
A. Problem Scope
To understand the problem scope of our work, we assume
a patient (P) admits to a hospital having chest pain for the
past several weeks. For emergency monitoring, a SHS is being
setup with several smart medical devices observing different
vital signs of the patient. For example, a cardiac monitoring
ECG device, a pulse oximeter and an EEG is placed on P to
monitor the level of oxygen on blood and neurological activity
on brain respectively. We also assume that all the device
is working perfectly and there is no compromised device
installed in the system. Finally, the system is programmed
to alert the physician and push medicine to the patient if any
sudden change in the heart of the patient. At some point, the
ECG started to alert the physician for the sudden drop of heart
rate. However, the vital signs from EEG and pulse oximeter
are normal, and the patient shows no sign of the change of
heart rate.
We introduce HealthGuard as a novel security framework
that can asses the overall status of the SHS and determines
whether a malicious event has occurred in the system. By
using HealthGuard, several security-related questions can be
answered in SHS: (1) Is the alert from one smart medical
device benign or malicious? (2) The alert generated by the
device is due to the influence of a disease or not? (3) Is there
any outside influence (human-made or device malfunction)
on the vital signs of the patient? (4) Whether an automatic
decision (e.g., pushing a new dose of medicine) taken by the
system is benign or not? Our proposed framework observes
each smart medical device and determines the overall status
of the system by connecting different vital signs of the
patient. Instead of making a decision based on one device, our
framework verifies the status of the patient by checking other
related vitals signs. Furthermore, HealthGuard can identify a
decision made by the system under the outside influence and
alert the physician to prevent any erroneous treatment.
B. Threat model
HealthGuard considers malicious device behavior (e.g., an
unauthorized user changing the device states) that may result
in abnormal functionality of the SHS. We describe the possible
attack scenarios for our work [19]. It considers the attack-
ers’ system model knowledge, its disruption resources, and
disclosure resources. Disruption resources enable an attacker
to affect system operation and availability while disclosure
resources enable the attacker to obtain sensitive information
about the system during the attack by violating the data
confidentiality. System model knowledge often provides an
attacker with intimate details on the system to perform more
complex attack.We chose three different types of attacks that
cover all three properties of attack space.
Our threat model includes (1) tampered medical devices, (2)
Denial of Service (DoS) attack, and (3) false data injection.
If an attacker has prior system knowledge, his disclosure
resources can make false data injection attack. DoS attack
makes disruption of the resource while tampered device at-
tack can cause disruption and disclosure resources both. To
better capture the threat model, we classify the threats in the
following three categories:
• Threat 1 - Malicious Behavior 1. A malicious attacker can
exist in the environment and inject forged data to perform
malicious activities to change the physical condition of
a patient. This threat represents false data injection in a
medical device [20].
• Threat 2 - Malicious Behavior 2. A malicious app can be
installed in any medical devices so that the device will never
go into the sleep mode. This threat represents a tampered
device attack [21].
• Threat 3 - Malicious Behavior 3. An attacker can physically
be present in the environment to tamper any of the medi-
cal devices to make it temporally unavailable. This threat
represents a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [22].
Note that, any passive attack such as eavesdropping or
information leakage via packet capture is considered out of the
scope of HealthGuard. We also assume that the data collected
from the SHS are not compromised.
V. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Fig. 2: HealthGuard framework.
In this section, we present a detailed overview of Health-
Guard. HealthGuard consists of four main modules: (1) data
collector, (2) data preprocessing, (3) anomaly detector and (4)
action management (illustrated in figure 2). The data collector
module collects data from different smart medical devices.
Here, each device provides a specific vital sign of the patient.
These data are merged into an array in the data preprocessing
module which represents the overall status of a patient at a
specific time. The array generated in the data preprocessing
module is fed into the anomaly detector module which decides
whether or not any malicious activity is running in the SHS.
Finally, the action management module notifies healthcare
professionals whenever a malicious activity is detected in
the SHS. The following sub-sections give details about these
modules.
A. Data Collector Module
Data collector module collects data from different medical
devices of a SHS. In a SHS, there can be multiple devices
connected to a network and operating in a co-dependent
manner. Data collector module collects the vital signs and
status of the patients from these devices and saves it into a
database. Based on the data collected from different devices,
the collected data from each device can be represented by the
following equation:
Device Data, E = {D1, D2, D3, ..., Dn} (1)
where D1 is the set of features extracted from the device at
time t1, D2 is the set of features extracted from the device at
time t2 and so on. Each device data is represented by specific
data array and these data are forwarded to data preprocessing
module for sampling and data merging.
Device Monitoring Type Model Feature Parameter Value Database Ref.
Heart Rate and Blood Pressure QuadioArm 60-100 beats per minute, Systolic (120 mm Hg) and Diastolic (80 mm Hg) Fetal ECG Synthetic Database, Data.Gov [23]
Blood Glucose MiniMed 670G Insulin Pump System 70-130 mg/dl UCI machine learning database of diabetes [24]
Blood Oxygen iHealth Air Wireless Pulse Oximeter Oxygen Saturation level ≥ 94% Pattern Analysis of Oxygen Saturation Variability [25]
Respiratory and Sweating Rate QuardioCore 12-20 Breaths per minute, 0.5µ/min/cm2 BIDMC PPG and Respiration Dataset [26]
Blood Alcohol Scram Continuous Alcohol Monitoring (Cam) 0.08 g/dl StatCrunch dataset [27]
Blood Hemoglobin Germaine AimStrip Hb Hemoglobin Meter 12.3-17.5 g/dl Hemoglobin Data in DHS Survey [28]
Neural Activity Emotiv Insight Delta (0.5-4 Hz), Theta (4-8 Hz), Alpha (8-12 Hz), Beta (16-24 Hz) & EEG / ERP data EEG / ERP data [29]
Sleep and Human Motion Fitbit Versa Smart Watch REM and NREM sleep cycle The CAP Sleep Database [30]
TABLE I: Devices and parameters considered for monitoring health condition.
B. Data Preprocessing
The data collector module forwards the collected data to
the data preprocessing module to build the dataset of different
features and aggregate them to a single array. Data collected
from different devices in the data collector module consists of
different patient’s vital signs and status. Data merging process
takes these vital signs and status to feature consideration.
As different medical device has a different sampling rate,
data preprocessing module sample the data according to the
corresponding sampling frequency. For example, a heartbeat
monitoring device measures the heartbeat of a patient in a
minute (beat per minute). On the contrary, ECG monitoring
device monitors the cardio-vascular state of a patient in
every 10 seconds. These collected data from different devices
are sampled and represented as per minute data, and data
preprocessing module merges these sampled data in a single
array. The data array represents the overall state of a SHS at
a given time. This array can be represented as follow:
Data Array, S = {S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn} (2)
where S1, S2, ......, Sn is the set of features extracted
from Device1, Device2, ......, Devicen in every minute re-
spectively. Data preprocessing module forwards the data array
to anomaly detector module for training the analytical model
and detecting malicious state in the SHS.
C. Anomaly Detector Module
Anomaly detector module uses the data arrays generated
in the previous module to train different Machine Learning
(ML) algorithms and detect malicious activities in the SHS.
We consider two features (low computation/detection time
and easy implementation) while choosing ML algorithms for
HeatlthGuard. As the delay in anomaly detection can cause
critical consequences to patients, low computation/detection
time is a must. Again, smart healthcare devices have very low
computation capability, which requires easily implementable
ML algorithms in the anomaly detector. Based on these
needs, we have selected the Artificial Neural Network (ANN),
Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), and K-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN) algorithm as these offers fast computation
and easy implementation feature [31], [32].We briefly discuss
these ML algorithms and our rationale to choose them below:
• Artificial Neural Network (ANN): The artificial neural net-
work is a computational model based on the functions of
biological neural networks being adapted by researchers
for anomaly detection. Here, the relationship among the
attributes of a dataset is compared with the biological
neurons, and a relationship map is created to observe the
changes for each attribute [33]. We chose the Multi-layer
Perceptron algorithm (MLP) for training the HealthGuard
framework because our classification is multiclass, not bi-
nary classification and it is a supervised learning problem.
• Decision Tree (DT): A decision tree uses a non-parametric
modeling technique for regression and classification prob-
lems. It uses divide and conquers approach and recursively
select the attribute that is used to partition the training
dataset into subsets until each leaf node in the tree has a
uniform class membership [34]. For HealthGuard, we tested
our dataset on decision tree because of the hierarchical
patterns in our data set.
• Random Forest (RF): Random forest is an ensemble classi-
fier that uses many decision trees to model. Here, a different
subset of training data is selected with replacement to train
each tree. We chose random forest to get more accurate and
stable prediction for multi-class classification problem [35].
• K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN): The K-Nearest Neighbors algo-
rithm is instance-based learning that only stores the training
samples. But does not generate a specific classification
model. During classification, distances between test and
training samples are calculated, and the test sample is
assigned the same class label as its nearest neighbor. We
chose K-nearest neighbor because it required very little
training time for multi-class data sets [36].
D. Action Management Module
The final module of HealthGuard is the action management
module which notifies the healthcare professional in the event
of any malicious activity in the SHS. Additionally, Health-
Guard can also detect any autonomous decision taken by the
system as a result of malicious activities and prevent erroneous
actions of the system from avoiding any fatal consequence.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility
of HealthGuard in detecting malicious activities in a SHS. We
consider several research questions to evaluate HealthGuard in
detecting malicious attacks.
RQ1 What is the performance of HealthGuard in differentiating
an incident occurring on disease-affected user and normal
user? (Sec VI-C)
RQ2 What is the performance of HealthGuard in detecting
different malicious attacks in SHSs? (Sec VI-D)
RQ3 What is the impact of the number of devices in SHS on
the performance of HealthGuard? (Sec. VI-E)
RQ4 What is the impact of the number of attacks occurring
in the SHS on the performance of the HealthGuard?
(Sec. VI-F)
Disease Type ECG SW BP GL BR OX SL HG AL NA HM Ref.
High blood Pressure - X X X - X X X X X - [37]
High Cholesterol - X X X - X - X - X - [38]
Excessive sweating X X X X - X - X - X X [39]
Abnormal oxygen level X - X X X X X - - X X [40]
High or low blood sugar X X X X - X - X - X - [41]
TABLE II: Device status in disease affected scenarios.
A. Training Environment and Methodology
To test the efficacy of HealthGuard, we collected data from
eight different smart medical devices available on the Internet
for different normal user activities and disease-affected users.
We have selected eight smart medical devices that gave us the
heart rate (ECG), blood pressure (BP), blood glucose (GL),
oxygen (OX) saturation, blood hemoglobin (HG), respiratory
or breathing (BR) rate, blood alcohol (AL), neural activity
(NA), human motion (HM) and sleep (SL) monitoring of a
person. We considered the threshold values of different vital
signs of humans (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) as a
normal state. For example, the oxygen saturation level for a
healthy person is 94-99%, and blood hemoglobin is 12.3 -
17.5 g/dl and HealthGuard considers this range as a normal
range for a user. The list of devices and a list of selected
features and sources are given in Table I. In addition to these,
we considered five different disease scenarios to understand
the normal operation in disease affected scenarios of SHS
thoroughly. We collected data from the selected smart medical
devices for high blood pressure, high cholesterol, excessive
sweating (SW), abnormal oxygen level, abnormal blood sugar.
For a specific disease, a group of different but specific devices
gives vital signs that are beyond the range of normal threshold.
HealthGuard considers these data as disease-affected data and
labels as normal operation of the SHS. The list of disease and
the corresponding devices are given in Table II.
In the training environment, we also considered seven reg-
ular user activities (sleeping, walking, exercise, stress, drunk,
heart-attack, and stroke situation) and observed how the vitals
from different smart medical changes with the activities. For
a specific activity, a group of devices exhibits changes in the
vital signs. For example, when a person does exercise his
heart-rate rises, glucose, oxygen, hemoglobin level decreases,
sweating increases and certain brain waves exhibit in the
monitoring device [42]. Similarly, when a person is in stress
condition, his heart-rate might rise, blood pressure increases,
sweating, breathing increases and a certain part of the brain
is affected [43]. We considered these as benign user activities
and labeled as normal operation of a SHS. A detailed list of
normal user activities considered in HealthGuard is given in
Table III.
Activity Type ECG BP GL BR OX SW HM HG AL NA Ref.
Sleeping X X X X X - - - - - [44]
Walking X - X X X X X X - X [42]
Stress X X - X - X - - - X [43]
Exercise X X X X X X X - - X [45]
Drunk - X X X - - - - X [46]
Heart-Attack X - - X - X - - - X [47]
Stroke X X - - - - X X - X [48]
TABLE III: Device affected for normal activity pattern.
For making the malicious dataset, we simulated three differ-
ent attack scenarios for a SHS based on the adversary model
described in Section IV. To perform the attack for Threat 1, we
considered an attacker injected false data to medical devices
to perform malicious activities. For Threat 2, we considered a
malicious app installed in any of the devices which disables the
sleep mode in the device (tampered device attack). For threat
3, we simulated a scenario to impede the normal operation of
a smart medical device which illustrates the DoS attack in the
system. We built a simulation environment in MATLAB using
digital signal processing toolbox and Poisson distribution to
randomize the attack scenario. We used Poisson distribution
to describe the attack scenarios as rare events in a large dataset.
To test HealthGuard, we collected 20,000 data instances
in total where 17,000 were for healthy and disease infected
people, and 3,000 were simulated attack data in dataset. Next,
we divided our data into two sections, where 70% of the
collected dataset was used to train the framework, and 30%
of the collected data along with malicious dataset were used
for testing purpose [49].
Benign Malicious
KNN DT RF ANN KNN DT RF ANN
Accuracy 0.903 0.931 0.898 0.927 0.878 0.909 0.865 0.910
Precision 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.90
Recall 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.91
F1-score 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.89
TABLE IV: Performance of HealthGuard in detecting benign
and malicious events in SHS.
B. Performance Metric
In the evaluation of HealthGuard, we used four different
performance metrics: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1-score.
Accuracy refers to the degree of closeness of a measured
quality to that quality’s true value, and Precision calculates the
fraction of correct positive identifications. Recall identifies the
portion of correctly identified positives. F1-score measures a
test’s accuracy considering both precision and recall.
C. Evaluation with only disease-affected and normal activities
In a SHS, different benign but rare events can occur as an
effect of a disease in the patient’s body and user activities (e.g.,
sleeping, working out, etc.). A security framework should
be able to detect these diverse types of events correctly. To
evaluate the performance of HealthGuard in detecting benign
activities, we chose twelve different scenarios in total includ-
ing vitals collected for seven user activities and five disease-
affected scenarios. Table IV presents the evaluation results
associated with different benign activities. We can observe
that accuracy, and F1score varies from 90-93% for different
algorithms. We achieved the highest accuracy and F1score
of 93% using the DT algorithm. We can also observe that
HealthGuard achieved the lowest accuracy of 89% using the
RF algorithm. The accuracy of KNN and ANN are 90.3% and
92.7% respectively. In summary, HealthGuard can achieve the
highest accuracy and F1score using a decision tree algorithm
for correctly identifying benign activities.
Device Count 4 5 6 7 8
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score
KNN 0.812 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.823 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.845 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.878 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.878 0.88 0.88 0.87
DT 0.839 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.850 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.866 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.909 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.909 0.91 0.91 0.90
RF 0.772 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.778 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.804 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.865 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.865 0.86 0.86 0.86
ANN 0.811 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.828 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.861 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.9111 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.910 0.90 0.91 0.89
TABLE V: Performance evaluation of HealthGuard considering different number of devices.
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Fig. 3: Accuracy of HealthGuard for different ML algorithm (a) KNN, (b) DT, (c) RF, (d) ANN.
D. Evaluation with Different Attack Scenarios
To evaluate HealthGuard against different malicious attacks,
We considered three different threats (tampered device, DoS,
and false data injection attack) in a SHS. We collected 3000
different instances for these attack scenarios and tested Health-
Guard. From Table IV, we can observe the ANN algorithm
performs with the highest accuracy and F1score of 91% and
89% respectively. For the DT algorithm, one can notice that
the accuracy decreases to 90% while F1score increases slightly
(90%). For KNN and RF, accuracy and F1score vary from 86-
87%. In short, the ANN algorithm performs better in detecting
different malicious activities in SHS.
E. Evaluation with Different Number of Devices
In a SHS, a different number of smart medical devices can
be connected to monitor the overall status of a patient or
user. To test the effect of the number of connected devices
in HealthGuard, we change the configuration of SHS and
performed the detailed evaluation (Table V). We can observe
that the accuracy and F1score decreases with the number of
connected devices in SHS. HealthGuard performs better if
the SHS has more devices connected in the system as it is
easier to detect an event correctly with more vital signs giving
information about the patient/user. We can observe that ANN
performs the best with the accuracy and F1score range of 81-
91% and 77-89% for 4 and 8 connected devices respectively.
We can also notice that DT is less affected for decreasing the
number of devices as the accuracy and F1score change only
7% and 9% respectively. In summary, HealthGuard achieves
the highest accuracy and F1score using ANN, however, the
performance is less affected in DT with a decreasing number
of devices in SHS.
F. Evaluation with Simultaneous Attack Scenarios
A SHS can be vulnerable to multiple malicious attacks at the
same time. To understand the effect of multiple simultaneous
attacks on HealthGuard, we simulated different simultaneous
attacks using Poisson distribution. Figure 3 illustrates the
impact of simultaneous attacks on HealthGuard. We can notice
that all the detection mechanism performs with the highest
accuracy if only one attack is active in the system. The
accuracy decreases with the number of attacks in the system.
We can also observe that ANN performs with the highest
accuracy in all three scenarios (one attack, two attacks, and
three attacks). HealthGuard can achieve 93% accuracy for one
and two simultaneous attacks and 91% accuracy for three
simultaneous attacks using ANN.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smart Healthcare Systems offer better diagnostic tools and
treatment for patients, but they also raise many security
concerns, as discussed in this work. To address these security
concerns, in this paper, we presented HealthGuard, a novel
machine-learning-based security framework that can assess the
overall status of a SHS and can determine if there is any
malicious activity has occured in the system. We evaluated
HealthGuard in multiple medical settings considering healthy
and disease-infected people in a SHS. Moreover, HealthGuard
is highly effective and efficient in detecting several threats.
Specifically, HealthGuard can achieve 91% accuracy in de-
tecting different attacks.
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